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Abstract 
The ability of markets to aggregate dispersed information is a cornerstone of economics and 
finance.  In a seminal experiment, Plott and Sunder (1988) offer support for the rational 
expectations hypothesis.  However, recent laboratory experiments have called into question 
the robustness of those initial results.  In this paper, we offer the first attempt to directly 
replicate key findings of the original study.  Failing to replicate their results, the post-study 
probability that market performance is better described by rational expectations than the prior 
information (Walrasian) model is low.  Given this result, we introduce a new treatment that 
implements a market structure consistent with naturally occurring prediction markets, which 
can be viewed as completing the original experimental design.   In this new treatment, we find 
strong support for the rational expectations model.  Thus, while the original paper showed 
conditions where markets can aggregate information, we attempt to identify sufficient 
conditions for such aggregation to be robust.    
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1. Introduction 
The ability of markets to aggregate dispersed information has long played a critical role in the 
debate over the optimal allocation of scarce resources in Economics. Hayek (1945) famously 
emphasized that markets could serve as a mechanism to aggregate and convey highly-dispersed 
information to the rest of society via prices. Although most economists are sympathetic to the 
Hayekian argument, the ongoing debate between classical and behavioral finance testifies to 
the existence of open disagreements regarding the extent to which the efficient market 
hypothesis holds in practice, i.e., the extent to which market prices accurately reflect available 
information (Fama, 1970; Fama, 2008; Shleifer, 2000; Thaler, 2005, 2015; Shiller, 2015). This 
debate is fueled by the lack of a widely-accepted methodology to gauge whether naturally 
occurring markets are indeed efficient. Indeed, Fama (1991) acknowledged that “market 
efficiency per se is not testable” (p. 1575).  
However, the emergence of experimental economics (Chamberlain, 1948; Smith, 1962) made it 
possible for economists to construct markets in which they would not only have perfect control 
over the distribution of private information but also know the fundamental value of the asset 
being traded. Thus, experimental markets enable researchers to study the aggregation of 
private information, rendering the efficient market hypothesis testable. This effort was initiated 
by Plott and Sunder (1988), hereafter P&S, who designed experimental markets to gauge the 
extent to which dispersed private information was incorporated into prices.1 In their design, 
subjects traded assets that delivered one of three possible dividends at the end of each market 
period based on a randomly determined state (X, Y, or Z). Each trader was endowed with 
private information ruling out one of the possible states (e.g., Not X). Because P&S ensured half 
the traders were given one piece of information, while the other half were given the 
complementary piece of information (e.g., half told not X and half told Not Y), the aggregate 
information held by market participants was complete (e.g., the state must be Z).  
P&S report evidence that, in line with the efficient market hypothesis, market prices can reflect 
the true asset value if there are contingent markets for each possible state (referred to in P&S 
as Series B) or if there is a single asset yielding common state-specific dividends to all traders 
(referred to in P&S as Series C).  An equally important, but oft-ignored finding of P&S, is the 
fragility of successful information aggregation.  P&S (p. 1117) highlight this in their conclusion 
when they point out that “not all markets can be depended upon to behave in accord with the 
rational expectations model.”  In particular, P&S found that markets with a single asset but 
diverse state-specific dividends (referred to in P&S as Series A) do not yield prices consistent 
 
1 In a previous paper, Plott and Sunder (1982) demonstrate that markets disseminate information as prices reflect 
the information of fully informed insiders.   
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with the rational expectations model.2  Even for Series B and Series C, P&S are careful to qualify 
their conclusions as  “demonstrat[ing] that markets can aggregate diverse information in a 
manner consistent with rational expectations models” (P&S, p. 1116, emphasis added) and not 
that they will.  However, the literature has often taken P&S to imply that markets will aggregate 
information.  For example, Choo, Kaplan, and Zultan (2019) state “[P&S] show that market 
prices converge to the true value of the asset” (p. 627). Kwasnica, Velthuis, and Williams (2019) 
write that P&S “document that the rational expectations equilibrium provides an accurate 
prediction of prices” (p. 329).  Rud, Rabanal, and Sharifova (2019) cite P&S when noting 
“competitive markets aggregate information quickly” (p. 263).3   
The positive results of P&S have been highly influential and prediction markets have 
subsequently come to be viewed as a mainstream tool for decision makers wanting to 
aggregate information (see Arrow et al., 2008).  There has been a wave of field studies 
discussing the successful use of prediction markets at major companies such as Hewlett-
Packard, Ford, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo and IBM (Chen and Plott, 2002; Cowgill, Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz, 2009; Cowgill and Zitzewitz, 2015).4  Pennock et al., (2001) and Gürkaynak and 
Wolfers (2006) find that prediction markets are better at forecasting Oscar winners and 
economic variables, respectively, than experts in those areas.  Tetlock (2004) demonstrates that 
financial and political contracts on (the now shuttered) Tradesports.com were efficient.5 Berg, 
Forsythe, Nelson, and Rietz (2008) report that the Iowa Electronic Markets outperform more 
traditional polling.  More recently, Atanasov, et al., (2017) show that prediction markets were 
more accurate than the means of prediction polls for a wide variety of 261 economic and policy 
event forecasts.    
Despite these affirmative empirical results, evidence from a number of recent experimental 
studies has cast doubt on the robustness of the market’s ability to aggregate dispersed private 
information.  Several works using variants of the P&S design with a single asset (Series C) have 
reported substantial mispricing (see Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget, 2005; Hanson, Oprea 
and Porter 2006; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2010; Huber, Angerer and Kirchler, 2011; Corgnet, DeSantis 
and Porter, 2015, 2019; Page and Siemroth, 2017; Corgnet, Deck, DeSantis and Porter, 2018). 
Similarly, Page and Siemroth (2018) report a failure to aggregate private information in 
contingent claims markets, though their setup differed from P&S (Series B), as they studied the 
 
2 A follow-up study by Forsythe and Lundholm (1990) showed that full information aggregation could be achieved 
when the same cohort of subjects was re-invited for a second trading session where the distribution of 
heterogeneous dividend values of the single asset was common knowledge among all traders. 
3 There are many papers that use somewhat ambiguous phrasing on this point, but certainly do not warn readers 
that P&S shows aggregation is possible rather than robust.    
4 There have also been several subsequent studies examining the ability of other systems to aggregate diverse 
information (Hampton 2007; Gillen, Plott and Shum, 2017; Court, Gillen, McKenzie and Plott, 2018).  
5 Sports contracts on the exchange exhibited some inefficiencies such as a bias for longshots as has been observed 
in other gambling data.   
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more intricate case of aggregate uncertainty (see Anderson and Holt, 1997) in which all private 
signals available in the market cannot fully reveal the true asset value.6 Of course, there have 
been some studies supporting the rational expectations hypothesis.  For example, Choo, 
Kaplan, and Zultan (2019) observed information aggregation in a setting with common state-
specific dividends and a full set of contingent claims. In this setting, the information structure 
differs from P&S as traders possessing different private signals may hold identical beliefs about 
the true asset value.  
This paper seeks to reconcile the apparent contradictory evidence regarding the ability of 
markets to aggregate information.  Mixed evidence in a given field is likely to produce self-
serving biases leading researchers to interpret the ambiguous evidence as supporting their own 
views of the world (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Dawson, Gilovich and Reagan, 2002; 
Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014). Progress thus requires the establishment of empirical facts 
that outline critical boundary conditions of the informational efficiency of markets.  To that 
end, we conduct a direct replication of P&S Series B (contingent claims) and C markets 
(homogeneous values).7  Replication has been shown to be especially relevant to cases in which 
original studies report striking findings based on small samples as in P&S (De Long and Lang, 
1992; Ioannidis, 2005; Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014).8 This is the case because the 
probability that a declared research finding is actually true (the so-called ‘Post-Study 
Probability’ or PSP in Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014) increases with sample size and the prior 
belief in the hypothesis. Although prior beliefs (before P&S reported their findings) regarding 
the empirical success of rational-expectation models are difficult to pin down, the precursory 
statement of Radner (1982, p. 942) that these models require computational capacity “far 
beyond what is realistic” when traders hold dispersed information suggest they were low. 
However, given the magnitude of the effects observed in P&S, all but the most ardent skeptics 
would be convinced by the evidence put forth in P&S.   
Ultimately, we fail to replicate the results of P&S.  Given the statistical power of our replication, 
the PSP that Series B- and C-style markets aggregate information is very low even if one held 
strong affirmative priors before observing the seemingly compelling evidence in P&S.  This 
result highlights the importance of interpreting P&S as providing a sort of existence proof for 
efficient markets rather than robust evidence that markets in general are efficient.  It also 
emphasizes the need for independent replication of results.     
 
6 Page and Siemroth (2018) consider a common dividend value environment. 
7 Previous partial replications have introduced potential confounds such as computerization (Hanson, Oprea and 
Porter, 2006), the use of call auctions (Biais, Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget, 2005), and a cost of information 
acquisition (Corgnet, Deck, DeSantis and Porter, 2018).    
8 The main findings of P&S regarding information aggregation in series B and C are based on only five markets each 
of which uses a different information structure. 
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Given our finding, we then extended the experimental design of P&S by introducing Series D 
markets in which traders have homogeneous values and there are contingent claims markets.9  
Many of the successful prediction markets in operation discussed above as well as the 
laboratory experiments of Choo, Kaplan and Zultan (2019) are best described as Series D 
markets; however, we are not aware of any studies directly comparing Series D markets to 
Series B or C markets.10  In our Series D markets we find overwhelming support for the rational 
expectations hypothesis and the PSP is quite high even for those who are skeptical a priori.          
Taken together, our results and those of P&S indicate that whether markets aggregate 
information or not is to a large degree a matter of market design.  Markets can be structured in 
ways that are more or less conducive to information aggregation.  In particular, the evidence 
suggests that homogeneous values and contingent claims, features that are present in most 
prediction markets in the field, both enhance the likelihood of information aggregation.  
Further, it is the combination of these two features that yields reliable information aggregation.     
2. The Experiments of Plott and Sunder 
In P&S traders are endowed with an amount of money, denoted in Francs, and assets called 
certificates that can be bought and sold by the traders using a continuous double auction.  At 
the end of each trading period, certificates pay their owner a dividend that depends on the 
state of nature, which can be X, Y, or Z.  The state of nature is not known by any trader, but the 
probability distribution over states is common information. Further, half the traders are 
informed of one unrealized state; while, the other half are informed of the other unrealized 
state. So for example, if the state is X, then half the traders are informed the state is not Y and 
half are informed it is not Z.  In aggregate the traders have sufficient information to determine 
that the state is X.  If markets successfully aggregate dispersed information, then the price 
should reflect the value the traders have for the certificates in the realized state.     
P&S present the results of 11 total sessions from three series of markets. Although never 
described as such, one can view the experiment of P&S as having a partial 2x2 design in which 
they manipulate both the type of asset (single or contingent claims) and dividend values 
(homogeneous or heterogeneous). In Series A markets, different trader types had different 
dividend values for each state of nature, and there was a single asset trading in the market. In 
Series B markets, as in Series A, different types of traders had different dividend values, but 
there was a complete set of contingent claims, each of which only delivered a payout if the 
 
9 Our study thus falls in the most general category of replication which uses a new research design to further test 
the hypothesis of the original study (Cartwright, 1991; Hunter, 2001; Maniadis, Tufano and List, 2014). 
10 Surveys of experimental asset markets by Sunder (1995), Plott (2000), Deck and Porter (2013), and Morone and 
Nuzzo (2016) do not mention any such studies.    
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associated state was realized.11  Thus, the difference between Series A and Series B is the type 
of asset(s) – single or contingent claim – that was tradable. In Series C, dividend values were the 
same for all traders, and there was a single tradable asset.  The difference between Series A 
and Series C is the diverse or common dividend value of the single asset.  Series A is arguably 
the most complex setup of the three; while Series B and Series C each introduce simplifications 
expected to facilitate information aggregation.  
In P&S, the information aggregation hypothesis was rejected whenever the data on prices, 
allocation and profits were not better explained by the Rational Expectations model (hereafter 
RE) compared to two alternative models: Prior Information (i.e., Walrasian) and Maximin.12 We 
briefly describe these models below.  
Rational expectations (RE) 
If the pooled information of all traders identifies the asset value with certainty, the fully-
revealing rational expectations equilibrium price is the true asset value. To illustrate the 
mechanics, consider the case in which it is common knowledge that the asset value is 50, 240 or 
490 each with equal probability.  Suppose the true value is 50. In this case, half the traders 
would be given the signal “Not 240” and the other half would be given the signal “Not 490”. 
Before any trading occurs, the traders who receive the “Not 240” signal value the asset at 270; 
whereas, the “Not 490” traders value the asset at 145.  These traders would also recognize that 
should anyone have received a “Not 50” signal that trader would value the asset at 365.  The 
lack of traders willing to purchase the asset at a price between 270 and 365 thus reveals that 
none of the traders received the “Not 50” signal. This reveals that the true value must be 50, 
and so 50 would be the equilibrium price. 
Prior information (PI) 
In the prior information model, traders do not infer information regarding other traders’ signals 
from market prices, but they do apply Bayes’ rule to compute the expected asset value given 
the public information on the prior probability that a state is realized and their own private 
information (Lintner, 1969).  Each individual trader is assumed to be willing to spend all her 
cash to buy assets at a price below her prior belief of its value and would sell all her certificates 
at any price above her prior belief.  With sufficient liquidity, the market price will equal the 
prior belief of the trader type with the highest prior belief.  Again using the example where 50, 
240 and 490 are equally likely, a trader who received the signal “Not 50” would buy at prices 
below 365 and sell at prices higher than this.  A trader who received the signal “Not 490” would 
 
11 Heterogeneous dividend values ensure that there are always gains from trade.   
12 We use the terminology of P&S to facilitate comparison of results thus referring to the Walrasian Model as Prior 
Information (PI). 
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buy at prices below 145 and sell at prices higher than this.  Thus, if the true value is 240, then 
this would result in a price of 365.   
Maximin (MM) 
Similar to PI, market prices do not reveal all available private information in this model. Instead, 
a trader is assumed to buy the asset only when she is certain that the price is equal to or below 
the minimum dividend it could possibly yield, given the public information and her private 
information. With sufficient liquidity, the market price predicted by this model is equal to the 
minimum belief of the trader type with the highest belief of the minimum possible valuation of 
the asset.  Returning to the case in which the true value is equally likely to be 50, 240 or 490, a 
trader who received the signal “Not 50” would buy at any price below 240 while a trader who 
received the signal “Not 240” would pay at most 50.  Thus, if the true value is 490, then this 
would result in a price of 240. 
In Series A, P&S rejected the hypothesis that market prices aggregated private information. 
However, P&S reported successful information aggregation in Series B and C when the RE 
model outperformed the PI and MM models (in pairwise tests) in predicting prices (see Table III 
in P&S, p. 1105), certificate allocations (Table IV in P&S, p. 1106) and profit distributions (Table 
V in P&S, p. 1107).  These significant results are captured in Conclusions 2, 3 and 4 in P&S. 
The authors note “The fact that both the second and third series perform as predicted by the 
RE model leads us to suspect that the existence of instruments which enable traders to link the 
actions of others to a source of motivation is important to the information aggregation function 
of markets” (P&S, p. 1086).  Thus, P&S suggest that information aggregation is not a robust 
property of markets, but is possible under certain circumstances.   
3. Replication Experiments 
Following the replication procedures used by Camerer et al., 2016 (p. 1433), we attempted to 
replicate the most important statistically significant finding of the original study. For P&S that 
finding is that information aggregation successfully occurs in Series B and C markets. Our 
replication thus seeks to assess whether asset prices reveal all available private information in 
Series B and C markets. Following P&S, we compare the predictive ability of the RE model to 
that of PI and MM.  Our replication attempt was preregistered in the AEA RCT Registry as 
AEARCTR-0003660.  
Market Environment  
The parameters for the markets are shown in Table 1, which is a subset of Table I (P&S, p. 
1088). We replicated Markets 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9 which correspond to Series B and C.  The only 
change from P&S is the exchange rate for converting lab earnings into cash payments.  To 
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account for the cost of living difference in the approximately thirty years that have transpired 
since the original data were collected, the dollar per franc exchange rates have been doubled.13 
Within each series, all traders in a session started with the same endowment of cash and 
certificates at the beginning of each market period. As the initial endowment of Francs 
represents a loan from the experimenter, traders had to pay a fixed cost at the end of each 
market to repay this loan, meaning that subjects’ earnings were driven solely by dividends and 
capital gains/losses. The predicted prices under RE, PI and MM as well as the predicted ending 
allocation of certificates can be found in Table II (P&S, pp. 1091-1092) and are reproduced in 
Appendix A for each series, trader type, and realized state of nature. 
Table 1. Market Parameters 
Market 
(Series) 
Trader  
Type 
Number 
of Traders 
Initial Endowment Fixed 
Cost 
$/ 
FrancB 
Dividends Probabilities 
Certificates Francs X Y Z X Y Z 
4 (B) 
I 
II 
III 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
10,000 
0.006 
0.006 
0.006 
70 
230 
100 
130 
  90 
160 
300 
  60 
200 
0.35 0.20 0.45 
5 (B) 
I 
II 
III 
4 
4 
4 
2 
2 
2 
15,000 
15,000 
15,000 
15,000 
15,000 
15,000 
0.005 
0.005 
0.005 
140 
460 
200 
260 
180 
320 
600 
120 
400 
1/3 1/3 1/3 
7 (C) I 12 4 25,000 25,000 0.003 50 240 490 1/3 1/3 1/3 
8 (C) I 12 2 25,000 25,000 0.003 125 375 525 1/3 1/3 1/3 
9 (C) I 12 4 25,000 25,000 0.003 50 240 490 0.35 0.45 0.20 
The exchange rate reported in Table I of P&S (p. 1088) shows the exchange rate for Market 9 was 0.015.  We believe this 
was a typo as otherwise the payoffs for that market are not aligned with the payoffs for the other markets. 
Power and Sample Size 
Following Camerer et al., (2016), our aim was to ensure a statistical power of at least 90% to 
detect the P&S findings at a 5% significance level; thus, we adopt their method and estimate 
the multiple of the original sample size that would be needed to achieve 90% power by using 
the standard z-test power formula �3.242
𝑧𝑧
�
2
where z is the standard normal test statistic 
associated with the p-value of the original study.  The main statistically significant results of P&S 
correspond to the comparison between the RE model and the other two models regarding 
prices (P&S, Table III), allocations (P&S, Table IV) and profits (P&S, Table V). Regarding the 
results on prices and profits, the required sample size is 3.019 times as large as the original 
sample, as the reported p-values are all equal to 0.031, which is associated with a z statistic of 
 
13 The cost of living has indeed doubled in the US between 1988 and 2018 given an average annual inflation rate of 
2.5% over that period. Note that the original experiments and our replication use an experimental currency called 
Francs that is converted into local currency at the end of the session.  For most of P&S and all of our markets, that 
currency is dollars.  However, Markets 7 and 8 of P&S were conducted in India and thus payments were converted 
into rupees.   
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1.866.  Regarding allocations, the p-value is 0.048 so that the multiple of the original sample 
size that would be needed is equal to 3.791. We thus opted for a multiple of 4 and collected 
four times as much data as the original study in order to have sufficient statistical power. This 
value falls within the normal range of multiples used in recent replication attempts in 
economics and social sciences (see Camerer et al., 2016; 2018).   We thus recruited a total of 
144 subjects.14  All participants were recruited from Chapman University’s Economic Science 
Institute subject pool and were undergraduate students at that institution with no prior 
experience in information aggregation markets. 
Subject Experience and Earnings 
Because the duration and required experience varied across the markets in P&S, subjects were 
recruited for different durations with different participation payments and average earnings.15  
We were also careful to match the experience levels in P&S (see Table I, p. 1088).  In Market 8, 
the subjects were experienced in Market 7. In P&S this means that the subjects were 
participating with the exact same group of people in the two markets, since there were 12 
people in each market, and there was only one replicate of each market.  However, in P&S the 
subjects in Market 5 were experienced either in Market 3 or 4.  Thus, our Market 5 sessions 
were formed by combining half the subjects in one Market 4 session with half the subjects in 
another Market 4 session. The two remaining halves were also combined into a separate 
Market 5 session.  Table 2 summarizes the details of our experimental sessions. 
Procedures 
Conduct of each session closely followed the procedures laid out in P&S.  P&S (p. 1118) note 
that steps “were essentially similar to those described … in Plott and Sunder (1982) with 
appropriate modifications to the instructions…” Thus, all handouts and instructions for this 
hand-run experiment are based on details in Plott and Sunder (1982) and reflect differences 
that were noted in P&S to the fullest degree possible.  Each session consisted of five stages 
after subjects provided informed consent and a general script was read aloud.   A description of 
the five stages as well as copies of instructions and handouts is available in Appendix B.  
Finally, to guard against any bias from the auctioneer, the person serving in that role was 
unaware of the rational expectations price in every case and unfamiliar with the specifics of 
P&S, although that person had experience conducting double auctions in a classroom setting. 
  
 
14 The number of subjects is less than 4 replicates x 5 markets x 12 traders because Markets 5 and 8 involved 
experienced traders as discussed in the next subsection.    
15 The lab’s policy required that subjects be compensated in part based upon study duration.   
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Table 2.  Summary of Experimental Sessions 
P&S Market 
and Series 
Experience Subjects / 
Session 
PeriodsA Sessions Participation 
PaymentB 
DurationC Average 
Earnings 
(USD)D 
4 B None 12 13 4 $7 210 min 27.19 
5 B Market 4 12 9 4 $30 150 min 33.89 
7 C None 12 14 4 $7 180 min 39.78 
8 C Market 7 12 7 4 $27 120 min 15.64 
9 C None 12 17 4 $15 210 min 53.68 
A In periods 10-13 of Market 4 and 10-16 of Market 5, traders also completed Series A markets in P&S. We followed this 
procedure for Market 4, although we are not interested in analyzing Series A for which P&S did not report successful 
information aggregation. Throughout the remainder of this paper, when we refer to Market 4 we mean the Series B portion 
of the market in periods 1-9.  We did not complete periods 10-16 (Series A markets) in Market 5 as, unlike Market 4, traders 
who participated in Market 5 are not recruited for other sessions. This means any additional experience of Series A markets at 
the end of Market 5 could not have impacted any behavior relevant to our replication endeavor. 
B The participation payments for sessions of Markets 5 and 8 were large to ensure that subjects returned from Markets 4 and 
7 to ensure that we were able to match the experience levels of subjects in P&S (see Table I of P&S, p. 1088). Markets 7 and 8 
were conducted on the same day, with a one-hour lunch break in between. Markets 4 and 5 were conducted either 1 or 2 
days apart. For every Market 5 session, two subjects with experience in Market 9 were recruited as standbys in case a Market 
4 subject did not return for Market 5.  In one Market 5 session a single standby was used as an alternate.  To further 
encourage the subjects to return for the second session, Market 4(7) earnings were not paid until the end of Market 5(8), 
with subjects only receiving the participation payment at the end of Market 4(7).    
C The duration denotes the length of time for which the participants were recruited.  
D The earnings exclude the participation payments.       
 
4. Replication Results 
In this section we present our results in a manner parallel to the presentation in P&S.  For 
brevity, we show a graph (Figure 1) representing all asset prices in each period of the four 
replications of Market 9, the market most commonly adapted for subsequent research (Biais, 
Hilton, Mazurier and Pouget, 2005; Hanson, Oprea and Porter, 2006; Veiga and Vorsatz, 2010).  
Similar graphs for all the other markets can be found in Appendix C alongside additional 
statistical evidence. Horizontal lines indicate the predictions of the three competing models.  
The width of each period within a market is standardized to facilitate period-by-period 
comparisons across markets because despite the common duration of each period, the number 
of periods varies substantially by market.16  A first visual inspection suggests that prices differ 
from the RE model predictions regardless of the series and the market. In Table 3, we assess 
these differences using the same statistical approach as in P&S. 
 
16 The trades are presented in sequential order, but, as in P&S, timing within the 7-minute trading period is not 
reflected.     
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Tables 3, C1, and C2 present the same analyses for the replication data that P&S present in 
Tables III, IV, and V for the original data (P&S, pp. 1105-1107), respectively. The data in these 
tables are used to assess Conclusions 2, 3, and 4 of P&S that RE will outperform both PI and 
MM models in predicting prices (Table 3), allocations (Table C1) and profits (Table C2). While 
P&S found support for RE over PI and MM, we did not replicate these conclusions, as the RE 
model did not outperform either model at a 5% significance level, regardless of whether we 
look at prices, allocations or profits. 
Regarding prices, we assess the performance of the respective models using the three criteria 
proposed by P&S: mean absolute price deviation (hereafter MAD), log odds and percentage of 
convergent price changes. Following P&S, we give information aggregation its “best chance” by 
only considering the last occurrence of each of the possible asset values for each market (i.e., 
periods 7, 8 and 9 for Market 4 and periods 14, 15 and 17 for Market 9). To assess the MAD, we 
calculate the average across sessions of the absolute difference between the price and the 
value predicted by each model (PI, RE and MM) (see Appendix A or P&S).  For each session, this 
value is calculated as:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 ∶=  average
𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 �𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� 
where 𝑖𝑖 represents a transaction, t denotes a period in which a state was realized for the last 
time, 𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  corresponds to the transaction price, and 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 is the predicted price under the 
appropriate model. Thus, the mean absolute price deviation is computed as the average over all 
transactions in the last occurrence of each state of nature for each session. The second 
measure used in P&S is log odds, which we calculated by regressing, for each model, the 
observed prices in a given session on the predicted price under that model (using price data 
from the periods corresponding to the last occurrence of each state of nature). We then 
recovered the log likelihood value under the normality assumption. A third measure of 
information aggregation developed in P&S is the percentage of convergent price changes. The 
𝑁𝑁 + 1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 transaction is considered convergent if its price is no further from the selected model’s 
prediction than the price of the previous transaction, 𝑁𝑁. That is, the 𝑁𝑁 + 1𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡 transaction is 
deemed convergent if:  
�𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁+1,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� ≤ �𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡� 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑁𝑁 is the market price of the 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡ℎ  transaction. For each model, the ratio of convergent 
price changes to the total number of transactions over the three periods in which a state was 
realized for the last time per session is reported in Table 3.17  
 
17 As an initial transaction is required to determine if the subsequent transaction is convergent, we utilize the total 
number of transactions minus three (since we consider three market periods) as the denominator in this ratio. 
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An overview of Table 3 shows that the RE model does not outperform the other two models, 
regardless of the criterion or the series we consider. The RE model actually underperforms the 
PI model on the criterion of mean absolute price deviation (p-value = 0.048) when considering, 
as in P&S, all sessions from Series B and C. But, the RE model does outperform PI on the 
criterion of percentage of convergent price changes even though RE does not significantly 
outperform MM for this criterion. No model stands out with regard to the criterion of log odds. 
If we take Series B and C separately, we obtain a similar finding; RE does not perform 
significantly better than both of the other two models according to any of the three criteria. 
This contradicts Conclusion 2 in P&S (p. 1104) according to which “In markets with a complete 
set of state contingent securities (Series B) and in markets with a single security with uniform 
dividends (Series C) the RE model price predictions outperform both PI and MM.”  
Finding 1: We are unable to replicate the finding that the RE model outperforms the PI and MM 
models in terms of predicting prices in the Series B and C markets. 
Here we report two additional findings indicating that our results also hold when looking at 
Allocations and Profits, with the supporting evidence presented in Tables C1 and C2 of 
Appendix C to conserve space. 
Finding 2: We are unable to replicate the finding that RE outperforms PI and MM in predicting 
final asset allocations in the Series B and C markets, though RE outperforms PI when evaluating 
Series B markets separately 
Finding 3: We are unable to replicate the finding that RE outperforms PI and MM in predicting 
traders’ profits in the Series B and C markets, though RE outperforms PI and MM when evaluating 
Series C markets separately. 
As a final note on our replication, experience does not seem to encourage information 
aggregation in our sample, as evidence for information aggregation was not found despite using 
for each session, as in P&S, only the data for the last occurrence of each possible state of 
nature.18 Moreover, we do not find support for the RE model prediction when restricting our 
analysis to the 8 sessions in which the market was populated exclusively by experienced traders 
(see Appendix D for the analysis of Markets 5 and 8 combined). 
 
18 The general conclusions do not differ if data from every trading period is used.    
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Figure 1.  Prices in Market 9 Sessions 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
State Y X Y X Z Y Y X X Y Z Z Y Y X Z Z 
Average Prices 
P&S 253 100 229 95 458 240 245 50 175 242 490 480 240 240 50 489 489 
Rep 278 237 235 189 247 271 244 201 218 251 267 273 248 254 175 250 245 
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Table 3.  Comparison of Actual Prices to Prices Predicted by Three Models at the End of Each Market 
Market Experiments MAD Log Odds Under Normality Percentage of Convergent Price Changes 
Series Market Replicate PI RE MM PI RE MM PI RE MM 
B 
4 
1 78.30 100.38 90.88 -216.24 -225.24 -239.01 37.50 66.67 66.67 
2 81.30 97.20 58.58 -183.83 -184.21 -212.05 37.50 66.67 62.50 
3 56.10 109.00 89.92 -197.98 -210.01 -232.44 54.17 75.00 62.50 
4 50.61 89.80 93.86 -224.90 -250.29 -265.10 32.14 75.00 85.71 
5 
1 58.10 205.00 215.90 -686.42 -677.50 -781.58 38.10 66.67 33.33 
2 109.00 159.00 252.20 -731.43 -686.31 -814.38 40.91 77.27 31.82 
3 95.70 143.00 281.50 -726.08 -691.72 -840.57 35.71 71.43 35.71 
4 95.86 182.00 257.30 -629.24 -612.03 -698.57 40.00 75.00 20.00 
C 
7 
1 98.80 104.05 54.05 -188.57 -262.57 -250.43 56.00 60.00 44.00 
2 131.00 50.60 31.11 -206.06 -196.63 -186.21 53.57 50.00 46.43 
3 152.00 17.00 39.65 -402.91 -332.67 -372.38 47.62 66.67 33.33 
4 93.78 139.00 156.10 -272.60 -338.71 -318.74 46.88 50.00 53.13 
8 
1 134.00 56.20 31.23 -150.20 -154.51 -142.17 53.85 46.15 69.23 
2 103.00 14.10 55.40 -182.75 -156.68 -170.40 43.75 50.00 56.25 
3 75.00 125.00 157.80 -183.25 -211.84 -209.95 36.36 45.45 36.36 
4 35.79 82.20 71.27 -158.08 -200.83 -194.25 50.00 35.00 40.00 
9 
1 57.20 145.00 61.53 -244.81 -306.81 -294.03 53.57 75.00 60.71 
2 48.30 131.00 53.00 -154.65 -215.91 -201.88 50.00 42.86 57.14 
3 50.60 143.00 72.50 -193.37 -241.66 -229.72 54.55 59.09 59.09 
4 98.11 102.00 15.96 -249.64 -268.37 -226.30 56.00 68.00 60.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Sum Tests 
 
   ↑______↑ 
   ↓ 
↑______↑ 
        ↓ 
↑________↑ 
↓ 
↑________↑ 
↓ 
        ↑__________↑ 
     ↓ 
↑__________↑ 
               ↓ 
B-series Sessions 0 
0.012(PI) 
25 
0.327(RE) 
22 
0.575(RE) 
36 
0.012(RE) 
36 
0.012 (RE) 
32 
0.042(RE) 
C-series Sessions 35 
0.754(PI) 
19 
0.117(MM) 
61 
0.084(PI) 
59 
0.117(MM) 
25 
0.272(PI) 
47 
0.505(RE) 
All Sessions 61 
0.100(PI) 
96 
0.654(MM) 
140 
0.191(PI) 
144 
0.145(RE) 
195 
0.003(RE) 
154 
0.059(RE) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, the last period in which the state was Y and the last period in which 
the state was Z.  Each statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the lower portion of the table contains the associated test statistic 
and level of significance as well.  The model in parentheses is the one favored by the data based on the median.  This table is comparable to Table III in P&S.   
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5. Post-Study Probability that Series B and C Markets Aggregate Information 
It is reasonable to ask what the balance of evidence suggests about the likelihood that Series B- 
and C-style markets behave in a manner more consistent with RE than PI or MM.  This in part 
depends on one’s initial belief about the probability of this pattern holding.  Denoting one’s prior 
as π, Maniadis, Tufano and List (2014) show that following a rejection of the null hypothesis of 
no effect in favor of the alternative, the PSP is given by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 following a rejection = (1−𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋(1−𝛽𝛽)𝜋𝜋+𝛼𝛼(1−𝜋𝜋)                                                             (1)           
where α and β denote the probability of type I and II errors respectively.  If, on the other hand, 
one fails to reject the null in favor of the alternative then the PSP (of a treatment effect) is given 
by: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃 following a failure to reject = 𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋
𝛽𝛽𝜋𝜋+(1−𝛼𝛼)(1−𝜋𝜋)                                                (2) 
Focusing on MAD and treating the z-scores we used to calculate the desired sample size for our 
replication as our measure of the effect sizes (i.e. of the average difference between MAD under 
RE and MAD under an alternative model), one can determine the ex-post power of P&S to 
detect that effect size via the Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test.19  For the comparison to PI their 
power (equal to 1 – β) was 0.9457 and for comparison to MM it was 0.8963 using the 
conventional significance level of 0.05.  Table 4 shows the relationship between prior beliefs and 
posterior beliefs based on the evidence put forward by P&S using equation (1).  As is evidenced 
from the table, the PSP is quite high unless one held an extremely low prior.  Because of our 
replication sessions, P&S is not the only evidence available.  Maintaining the assumption that the 
true effect size is as large as is implied by the p-value reported in P&S, our replication had a 
power greater than 0.9999 both for the comparison of RE and PI as well as for the comparison of 
RE and MM under the Wilcoxon signed-rank sum test.  Applying equation (2) to the resultant 
posterior beliefs after observing the evidence from P&S yields the PSP for the combined 
evidence from the two sets of experiments.  As is clear from Table 4, the new evidence is enough 
to sway beliefs dramatically in the opposite direction for all but those who originally believed RE 
outperformed other models with near certainty.   
 
19 Ioannidis (2008) and Loken and Gelman (2017) have argued that reported effects in small-sample studies are 
likely biased upwards because of the “statistical significance filter” (i.e. the fact that a threshold is used to select 
which results are publishable and which are not, and to meet that threshold in a small sample study, which will 
typically have large standard errors, requires a large effect). However, we assume that the treatment effect 
observed by P&S is the true effect size as assuming the true effect size is smaller would reduce the power 
associated with their test. In Appendix F, we report additional analysis of PSP assuming the true effect size is two 
thirds as large and show that our results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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Table 4.  Post Study Probability that MAD Lower Under RE than PI or MM  
Probability RE outperforms PI  Probability RE outperforms MM 
Prior 
PSP after 
P&S 
PSP after 
Replication  Prior 
PSP after 
P&S 
PSP after 
Replication 
0.99 0.9995 0.1646  0.99 0.9994 0.1574 
0.95 0.9972 0.0364  0.95 0.9971 0.0346 
0.9 0.9942 0.0176  0.9 0.9938 0.0167 
0.75 0.9827 0.0059  0.75 0.9817 0.0056 
0.5 0.9498 0.0020  0.5 0.9472 0.0019 
0.25 0.8631 0.0007  0.25 0.8566 0.0006 
0.1 0.6776 0.0002  0.1 0.6658 0.0002 
0.05 0.4989 0.0001  0.05 0.4855 0.0001 
0.01 0.1604 <0.0001  0.01 0.1533 <0.0001 
        
6. New Series D Markets 
With a goal of showing that information aggregation could happen, it would be reasonable for 
P&S to stop the search after observing their positive results.  However, with so few independent 
markets, P&S offer little evidence as to the robustness of their findings.  Because our study failed 
to replicate the original findings, the boundary conditions for markets to aggregate dispersed 
information must be redrawn. We thus extended the P&S design to identify sufficient conditions 
for information aggregation with the aim of providing useful insights to practitioners.  
The failure of the efficient market hypothesis is at odds with the empirical evidence from field 
data suggesting that prediction markets are effective in aggregating information as discussed in 
the introduction.  Careful inspection of functioning prediction markets in practice reveals that 
they do not resemble Series B- or Series C-style markets.  Instead, these markets are typically 
structured as contingent claims markets with homogeneous values.20  That is, in practice 
markets combine both institutional features that were introduced separately by P&S to help 
facilitate efficient markets. Therefore, we ask if this combination will lead to successful 
information aggregation. That is, we complete the 2 × 2 experimental design of P&S by 
introducing Series D markets.       
 
20 Series A markets with a single asset and heterogeneous values can be thought of as markets for real assets.  For 
example, an umbrella will have a high value to a person wearing suede when it is raining, a fair skinned person 
when it is sunny, and no one when it is overcast.  Stocks and most other financial instruments are best described as 
Series C markets.   
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We introduce two new markets, which we refer to as Markets 12 and 13 to avoid confusion with 
the market numbering used in P&S.  Table 5 provides the relevant market parameters, which are 
adapted from those in P&S.  Predictions for prices and allocations for these markets can be 
found in Appendix A.       
Table 5. Market Parameters 
Market 
(Series) 
Trader  
Type 
Number 
of Traders 
Initial Endowment Fixed 
Cost 
$/ 
FrancB 
Dividends Probabilities 
Certificates Francs X Y Z X Y Z 
12 (D) I 12 2 25,000 25,000 0.006 125 375 525 1/3 1/3 1/3 
13 (D) I 12 2 25,000 25,000 0.006 50 240 490 0.35 0.45 0.20 
 The experimental procedures followed those used for the replication of Series B and C markets.  
Table 6 provides details for the experimental sessions.  The subjects who participated in the 
Series D markets were drawn from the same pool as those who participated in the replication 
study, but none had participated in those sessions or any other related studies.     
 
Table 6.  Summary of Experimental Sessions 
Market  
and  
Series 
Experience Subjects/ 
Session 
Periods Sessions Participation 
Payment 
DurationA Average 
Earnings 
(USD)B 
12 D None 12 13 4 $10 180 min 52.99 
13 D None 12 13 4 $10 180 min 49.36 
A The duration denotes the length of time for which the participants were recruited.  
B The earnings exclude the participation payments.       
Figures 2 and 3 show the transaction prices by period in each session for Markets 12 and 13, 
respectively, as well as the RE, PI and MM predictions.  The results are dramatically different 
from what we observed in our replication of Series B and C markets.  For Series D, prices 
consistently follow the RE predictions, reminiscent of the stark figures in P&S.          
For the statistical analysis we rely on the same series of tests employed for Series B and C.  The 
one caveat is that we do not analyze the allocation of assets for Series D.  This is because with 
homogeneous values, the rational expectations model makes no prediction regarding who 
should hold the assets after trading is completed.  We also note that RE and MM make the same 
profit predictions for Series D markets: both predict each subject will have the average earnings.  
Thus, profit can be used to compare PI to RE and PI to MM, but cannot be used to differentiate 
between RE and MM. 
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Figure 2a. Prices in Market 12 Sessions – Asset X 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13     
State Z Y X Y Z Z X X Z X Y Z X     
Average Prices    
 147 135 213 122 85 75 137 119 48 130 45 63 127     
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Figure 2b. Prices in Market 12 Sessions – Asset Y 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13     
State Z Y X Y Z Z X X Z X Y Z X     
Average Prices    
 172 258 164 296 133 82 93 99 89 22 297 68 87     
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Figure 2c. Prices in Market 12 Sessions – Asset Z 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13     
State Z Y X Y Z Z X X Z X Y Z X     
Average Prices    
 230 224 193 147 428 531 129 75 488 93 84 510 65     
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Figure 3a. Prices in Market 13 Sessions – Asset X 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13     
State Y Y Y X Z Z Z Y X Y Y Z Z     
Average Prices    
 82 72 60 74 40 49 28 25 76 22 11 26 1     
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Figure 3b. Prices in Market 13 Sessions – Asset Y 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13     
State Y Y Y X Z Z Z Y X Y Y Z Z     
Average Prices    
 132 185 232 108 81 62 52 213 49 238 224 67 44     
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Figure 3c. Prices in Market 13 Sessions – Asset Z 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13     
State Y Y Y X Z Z Z Y X Y Y Z Z     
Average Prices    
 118 81 70 63 239 392 453 101 45 52 24 418 439     
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Table 7.  Comparison of Actual Prices to Prices Predicted by Three Models at the End of Each Market 
Market Experiments MAD Log Odds Under Normality Percentage of Convergent Price Changes 
Series Market Replicate PI RE MM PI RE MM PI RE MM 
D 
12 
1 129.38 74.04 160.29 -950.79 -914.53 -998.76 21.43 78.57 57.14 
2 168.00 0.40 335.40 -542.71 -525.96 -597.05 100 100 100 
3 127.00 108.00 219.10 -1029.02 -1077.74 -1135.40 33.33 66.67 55.56 
4 170.70 73.50 138.70 -1191.32 -1198.80 -1258.64 26.09 78.26 65.22 
13 
1 107.08 41.03 101.31 -1113.53 -1083.91 -1200.78 20.00 90.00 80.00 
2 140.00 34.60 147.50 -901.13 -852.67 -940.53 50.00 85.71 78.57 
3 83.50 45.94 185.30 -724.62 -691.81 -813.43 50.00 66.67 83.33 
4 93.86 5.71 47.14 -490.26 -494.68 -530.05 0.00 100.00 100.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Sum Tests     ↑______↑ 
   ↓ 
↑______↑ 
        ↓ 
↑________↑ 
↓ 
↑________↑ 
↓ 
↑_______↑ 
   ↓ 
         ↑_______↑ 
                  ↓ 
D-series Sessions 36 
0.012 (RE) 
36 
0.012 (RE) 
25 
0.327 (RE) 
36 
0.012 (RE) 
35 
0.014 (RE) 
26 
0.178 (RE) 
B&D Sessions 80 
0.535(RE) 
125 
0.003(RE) 
94 
0.178(RE) 
136 
<0.001(RE) 
135 
<0.001(RE) 
112 
0.015(RE) 
C&D Sessions 148 
0.108(RE) 
138 
0.218(RE) 
79 
0.332(PI) 
150 
0.093(RE) 
180 
0.005(RE) 
137 
0.190(RE) 
All Sessions 218 
0.733(RE) 
276 
0.096(RE) 
218 
0.585(PI) 
339 
0.002(RE) 
376 
<0.001(RE) 
298 
0.022(RE) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, the last period in which the state was Y and the last period in which 
the state was Z.  Each statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the lower portion of the table contains the associated test statistic 
and level of significance as well.  The model in parentheses is the one favored by the data based on the median.  This table is comparable to Table III in P&S.   
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The statistical results are reported in Tables 7 and E1 (in appendix E).  The analysis strongly 
supports RE over both PI and MM.  The MAD is lower under RE than PI or MM in all eight 
sessions (p-values < 0.001). 
Combining the Series D data with the data from Series B and C, we can compare models for all 
contingent claims markets (Series B and D), homogeneous value markets (Series C and D), and 
all markets (Series B, C and D).   These tests can be found in the lower portions of Tables 7 and 
E1.  The statistical results favor the RE model over either of the other two models to varying 
levels of significance.  Only the markets which feature both contingent claims and 
homogeneous values (Series D) provide consistent support for the RE model across the various 
tests.    
So how convinced should one be that Series D markets aggregate information?  Table 8 
provides the PSP using equation (1) for various priors that one might hold, assuming the actual 
MAD treatment effect equals the z-score associated with our reported p-value of 0.012 (note 
that this is the p-value for comparisons of RE to each of the other two models; we use the z-
score for consistency with our PSP analysis of Series B and C markets).  Under this assumption, 
our ex post power for the comparison between RE and PI and for the comparison between RE 
and MM was greater than 0.9999 given a significance level of 0.05.21 While the implication from 
the table is that all but the very skeptical should conclude that Series D markets do aggregate 
information, it is worth noting again that a similar conclusion would have been drawn for Series 
B and C markets based on the data in P&S alone.  Thus, our own replication of P&S calls for 
caution with regards to our Series D results until independent replication of our findings is 
conducted.       
Table 8.  Post Study Probability that MAD Lower Under RE than PI or MM for Series D 
Probability RE outperforms PI  Probability RE outperforms MM 
Prior  PSP   Prior  PSP  
0.99   0.9995   0.99   0.9995  
0.95   0.9974   0.95   0.9974  
0.9   0.9945   0.9   0.9945  
0.75   0.9836   0.75   0.9836  
0.5   0.9524   0.5   0.9524  
0.25   0.8696   0.25   0.8696  
0.1   0.6896   0.1   0.6896  
0.05   0.5128   0.05   0.5128  
0.01   0.1681   0.01   0.1681  
 
21 As with Series B and C, if we assume that the true effect size is only two thirds of the reported effect size, the 
results remain qualitatively unchanged. See Table F2 in Appendix F. 
   
 
26 
 
7. Discussion 
Whether markets are able to aggregate dispersed information is a fundamental question in 
Economics (Hayek, 1945). Because testing the strong-form efficiency of markets is not possible 
using archival data (Fama, 1991), experimental markets are critical to test whether such 
efficiency is achievable. The breakthrough design proposed by P&S thus made the efficient 
market hypothesis falsifiable. Although the original findings in P&S show that it is possible for 
markets to achieve strong-form efficiency, our data show these findings are even more fragile 
than P&S recognized.  Moreover, neither the existence of contingent claims nor common 
dividend values alone are sufficient to facilitate robust information aggregation.  
Completing the experimental design of P&S by introducing Series D markets, which incorporate 
both contingent claims and homogeneous values, yields broad support for the efficient market 
hypothesis.  Further, this market structure is more similar to prediction markets operating in 
practice than any of the three markets considered by P&S, which suggests that market 
designers may have discovered this combination despite the absence of a direct institutional 
comparison in the literature.  This finding provides a key insight regarding institutional design 
for those assessing and designing markets in the lab or in the field.  A crucial implication of our 
findings is that a complete set of contingent claims will not guarantee strong-form efficiency. 
This means that carefully-designed markets might still be inefficient if the market is populated 
by agents with different preferences over assets.  Interestingly, these differences are likely to 
be magnified by the increasing globalization of financial markets because traders will more 
often face different regulatory constraints and tax systems and will more likely exhibit different 
attitudes toward risk (Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei, 2009). It follows that the informational 
efficiency of markets might decrease as a result of the increased diversity of market 
participants.  
While our work fails to replicate the results of P&S in a direct sense, our findings do support the 
broader notion that markets can aggregate information.  While their findings showed it is 
possible for markets to aggregate information, our results reveal conditions under which such 
aggregation is robust.  As described by P&S, both contingent claims and homogeneous values 
are features that provide “some knowledge about other traders’ preferences” (p. 1117).22  The 
ability to infer the intentions of other traders from their market actions and then update one’s 
own private information accordingly is critical for efficient markets.  Thus, the level of traders’ 
sophistication is likely a key component of market performance.  Hence, the one feature of P&S 
 
22 It is also the case that the contingent claims effectively introduce insiders in all but one of the markets.  
Specifically, for every state that does not occur some traders know that the associated asset is worth 0 (e.g. if the 
true state is X, then consider the markets for Y and Z).  Plott and Sunder (1982) found that markets with fully 
informed insiders had prices that reflected that information.  Our Series B results are evidence that insiders are not 
sufficient for information dissemination.     
   
 
27 
 
that we did not replicate, namely the subject pool, may be partially driving some of the 
observed differences.23 Recent work by Corgnet, DeSantis and Porter (2015) supports this 
conclusion as they find that markets with more cognitively sophisticated traders (as measured 
with cognitive reflection, Frederick, 2005) are more likely to have prices consistent with the 
rational expectations hypothesis.  Such a pattern again highlights the importance of effective 
market design. The lack of robustness of information aggregation results contrasts with 
numerous findings showing the robustness of competitive equilibria outcomes to various 
institutions (Smith, 1962; List, 2004) and levels of traders’ sophistication (Becker, 1962; Gode 
and Sunder, 1993).  Following Radner (1982), we posit that rational-expectation models are 
particularly demanding regarding the sophistication of economic agents which might explain 
the lack of robustness of their predictions compared to competitive equilibria predictions that 
do not hinge on rational expectations. 
 
 
 
 
23 P&S collected data from student subjects at Caltech and the Indian Institute of Management.   
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9. Appendices 
Appendix A. Prediction Tables 
Price predictions for Series B and C Markets are shown in Table A1. 
Table A1. Price predictions for each model (Due to P&S). 
Market Model True State X Y Z 
4X 
RE 230 0 0 
PI 146 146 101 
MM 0 0 0 
4Y 
RE 0 160 0 
PI 58 58 49 
MM 0 0 0 
4Z 
RE 0 0 300 
PI 169 208 208 
MM 0 0 0 
5X 
RE 460 0 0 
PI 230 230 230 
MM 0 0 0 
5Y 
RE 0 320 0 
PI 160 160 160 
MM 0 0 0 
5Z 
RE 0 0 600 
PI 300 300 300 
MM 0 0 0 
7 
RE 50 240 590 
PI 270 365 365 
MM 50 240 240 
8 
RE 125 375 450 
PI 325 450 450 
MM 125 375 375 
9 
RE 50 240 490 
PI 210 317 317 
MM 50 240 240 
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Allocation predictions for Series B and C Markets are shown in Table A2. 
Table A2. Allocation predictions for each model (Due to P&S). 
Type (I, II and III) and clue of traders who should hold the certificates according to a given model. 
Market Model True State X Y Z 
4X 
RE II ̶ ̶ 
PI II (Not Z) II (Not Z) II (Not Y) 
MM ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
4Y 
RE ̶ III ̶ 
PI III (Not Z) III (Not Z) III (Not X) 
MM ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
4Z 
RE ̶ ̶ I 
PI I (Not Y) I (Not X) I (Not X) 
MM ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
5X 
RE II ̶ ̶ 
PI II II (Not Z) II (Not Y) 
MM ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
5Y 
RE ̶ III ̶ 
PI III (Not Z) III III (Not X) 
MM ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
5Z 
RE ̶ ̶ I 
PI I (Not Y) I (Not X) I 
MM ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
7 
RE All (no trade) 
PI Not Y Not Y Not Y 
MM All (no trade) Not X Not X 
8 
RE All (no trade) 
PI Not Y Not X Not X 
MM All (no trade) Not X Not X 
9 
RE All (no trade) 
PI Not Y Not Y Not Y 
MM All (no trade) Not X Not X 
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Price predictions for Series D Markets are shown in Table A3. 
Table A3. Price predictions for each model. 
Market Model True State X Y Z 
12X 
RE 125 0 0 
PI 62.5 62.5 62.5 
MM 0 0 0 
12Y 
RE 0 375 0 
PI 187.5 187.5 187.5 
MM 0 0 0 
12Z 
RE 0 0 525 
PI 262.5 262.5 262.5 
MM 0 0 0 
13X 
RE 50 0 0 
PI 31.8 21.9 31.8 
MM 0 0 0 
13Y 
RE 0 240 0 
PI 135 166.2 166.2 
MM 0 0 0 
13Z 
RE 0 0 490 
PI 178.2 150.8 178.2 
MM 0 0 0 
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Allocation predictions for Series D Markets are shown in Table A4. 
Table A4. Allocation predictions for each model. 
Clue of traders who should hold the certificates according to a given model. 
Market Model True State X Y Z 
12X 
RE    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
PI All (no trade) Not Z Not Y 
MM    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
12Y 
RE    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
PI Not Z All (no trade) Not X 
MM    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
12Z 
RE    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
PI Not Y Not X All (no trade) 
MM    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
13X 
RE    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
PI Not Y Not Z Not Y 
MM     ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
13Y 
RE     ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
PI Not Z Not X Not X 
MM    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
13Z 
RE    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
PI Not Y Not X Not Y 
MM    ---------------------No predictions--------------------------- 
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Appendix B. Details for Conduct of Experimental Sessions and Complete Subject Instructions 
 
Description of Stages of a Session 
Stage 1.  Subjects were trained with the mechanism (a bingo cage) used to draw the state of nature. In 
Plott and Sunder (1982, p. 693), it is noted that 10-20 draws were completed until most subjects 
predicted the most likely outcome.  In our replication, there were always exactly 10 draws for this 
training.   
Stage 2. Subjects were trained with the mechanism to provide signals (referred to as clues) about the 
state of nature. P&S note (p. 1118) that this training lasted between 8 and 10 trials. In our replication, 
there were always exactly 10 draws for this training.  Subjects were given a Clue Sheet with 30 rows. The 
first 10 rows were used for training, and then their clue for the first market period was on row 11. This 
ensured that the number of possible periods on their Profit Sheets matched the number of remaining 
rows in the Clue Sheet, post-training. 
Stage 3.  Subjects were given an explanation of the market rules.  Because we wanted to use the same 
sequence of state realizations as in P&S and did not want to deceive the subjects, rather than continuing 
to randomly draw the state with a bingo cage as in Stage 1, our subjects were informed that “The 
outcomes were determined before the experiment began by drawing a ball from a bingo cage in a 
manner similar to what was described earlier.”  The subjects were not informed that the draws occurred 
thirty years before the session. We also went through an example sequence of bids, asks and 
acceptances. The example varied based on whether one or multiple assets were available for trade. As 
in P&S, subjects could hold short positions during trading, but incurred a penalty equal to 300 francs 
plus the highest transaction price in that period per unit short at the end of a trading period.  This 
contrasts with Plott and Sunder (1982, p. 696) where short positions were not allowed, and hence this 
necessitated a modification to the instructions.   
Stage 4.  The market was conducted for several periods, referred to as years in the experiment. Each 
period lasted for seven minutes, and all bids, asks and contracts were left visible on the board until the 
period ended. We conducted the sessions in rooms with ample whiteboard space, and we never had to 
erase information mid-period. The Information and Record Sheets were collected at the end of each 
period, and new Information and Record Sheets were handed out before the start of each period - 
subjects kept their Profit Sheet throughout Stage 4.  In our replication, subjects were allowed to use 
basic four-function calculators to update their Information and Record Sheets and Profit Sheet. Bids, asks 
and contracts from previous periods were erased before the next period began.  Subjects did not know 
how many periods of trading there would be, as the Profit Sheet always listed 20 periods.   
Stage 5.  The subjects received their payment in private and were dismissed from the experiment.   
Notes:  In Market 4 where the series type changes mid-session, the subjects repeated Stage 3 after 
period 9.  In Markets 5 and 8, which involve only experienced subjects and were conducted as brand-
new sessions, we repeated all five stages.   
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Steps to Run Hand Run Information Aggregation Markets 
Prior to Experiment  
1. Set up Bingo cage with correct number of balls and have a coin available. 
2. Have market program set up on podium computer (not projected).  Have document camera for 
Market Operation Example. 
3. Place a numbered (1 through 12) notecard at each position asking for subject name and student id. 
4. Place a) calculator, b) pen, c) Trader Sign, and d) Subject Name and ID Card at each position. 
5. Place a) Instruction Set 1, b) Response Form for random draw training, and c) Clue Sheets.   
Note: a) and c) are market specific. 
Subject Sign in  
6. Subjects consent 
7. Subjects fill out Subject Name and ID card and RA signs them into the market program 
Experiment 
8. Auctioneer reads Script 0 
9. Auctioneer reads Script 1   
10. Conduct 10 Drawings with replacement 
11. Collect Response Forms  
12. Auctioneer reads Script 2   
13. Auctioneer conducts 10 practice rounds with clues.   
a) draw a ball  
b) flip coin 
c) call out row (=practice number) and column (based on draw and flip) 
d) put ball back in bingo cage 
14. Handout a) Instruction Set 3, b) Profit Sheet, and c) Year 1 Information and Record Sheet.  Note: b) is 
market specific while a) and c) are market and trader specific. 
15. Auctioneer reads Instruction Set 3.  “___” is read as blank because this is private information for 
each trader.     
16. Auctioneer goes through the Market Operation Example.   
Order of call should be Trader #, Action, (Market), Price.    (Market) is only for contingent claims. 
17. Conduct Market Year  
a) Handout Year Y record and Information Sheet (already done for Year 1).  Note: This is market and 
trader specific  
b) Announce Clue row and column.  Row is 10+year.  Column indicated by “pickme.” 
c) Start 7 minute market year.  
d) Repeat a-c until last Year completed.  Number of Years differs by Market.   For Market 4, return to 
Step 14 after Year 9. 
18. Collect all papers.  Calculate total payments = Trading Profit + Prediction Payment from 12 + Show up 
Payment. 
19. Pay and dismiss subjects.    
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Set 0 Script 
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research 
foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money 
which will be paid to you in cash. In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which 
you will buy and sell certificates in a sequence of market years.  
This experiment has four steps: 
(1) training with the mechanism used to draw states of nature,  
 
(2) training with the mechanism used to provide clues about the state of nature,  
 
(3) explanation of procedures and rules of the market,  
 
(4) conduct of markets for several years. 
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Set 1 Script 
Instruction Set 1  [Market 4] 
Each year we draw a ball from a bingo cage containing twenty balls numbered one through 
twenty. If the ball drawn is numbered one through seven, outcome of the draw is called x; if a 
ball numbered eight through eleven is drawn, the outcome is called y; if a ball numbered twelve 
through twenty is drawn, the outcome is called z.  
You have to predict the outcome of each draw before it is announced. If your prediction is 
correct, you win $0.50; if wrong, you lose $0.20. Before the first draw is made, record your 
prediction by circling either x or y or z in the first row of the enclosed sheet. After you have 
encircled one letter, the outcome will be announced and you should record the announced 
outcome in the blank space on the same row of the table. If your prediction is correct, circle the 
amount shown in the Win column, otherwise circle the amount shown in the Lose column.  
Once you have recorded your prediction you must not make a change; any erasure will 
invalidate your prediction. At the end, add up your total winnings and losses and record the 
difference (net winnings or losses) at the bottom right corner of the sheet. 
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Instruction Set 1  [Markets 9 & 13] 
Each year we draw a ball from a bingo cage containing twenty balls numbered one through 
twenty. If the ball drawn is numbered one through seven, outcome of the draw is called x; if a 
ball numbered eight through sixteen is drawn, the outcome is called y; if a ball numbered 
seventeen through twenty is drawn, the outcome is called z.  
You have to predict the outcome of each draw before it is announced. If your prediction is 
correct, you win $0.50; if wrong, you lose $0.20. Before the first draw is made, record your 
prediction by circling either x or y or z in the first row of the enclosed sheet. After you have 
encircled one letter, the outcome will be announced and you should record the announced 
outcome in the blank space on the same row of the table. If your prediction is correct, circle the 
amount shown in the Win column, otherwise circle the amount shown in the Lose column.  
Once you have recorded your prediction you must not make a change; any erasure will 
invalidate your prediction. At the end, add up your total winnings and losses and record the 
difference (net winnings or losses) at the bottom right corner of the sheet. 
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Instruction Set 1  [Markets 5, 7, 8, & 12] 
Each year we draw a ball from a bingo cage containing thirty balls numbered one through 
thirty. If the ball drawn is numbered one through ten, outcome of the draw is called x; if a ball 
numbered eleven through twenty is drawn, the outcome is called y; if a ball numbered twenty-
one through thirty is drawn, the outcome is called z.  
You have to predict the outcome of each draw before it is announced. If your prediction is 
correct, you win $0.50; if wrong, you lose $0.20. Before the first draw is made, record your 
prediction by circling either x or y or z in the first row of the enclosed sheet. After you have 
encircled one letter, the outcome will be announced and you should record the announced 
outcome in the blank space on the same row of the table. If your prediction is correct, circle the 
amount shown in the Win column, otherwise circle the amount shown in the Lose column.  
Once you have recorded your prediction you must not make a change; any erasure will 
invalidate your prediction. At the end, add up your total winnings and losses and record the 
difference (net winnings or losses) at the bottom right corner of the sheet. 
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States of Nature Training Sheet 
Subject No. _______ 
Number 
Circle One 
Decision 
Outcome 
x or y or z 
Win 
($) 
Lose 
($) 
1 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
2 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
3 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
4 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
5 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
6 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
7 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
8 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
9 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
10 x   y   z _____ 0.50 -0.20 
 
       Total winnings      _________        
       Total losses      _________ 
           Net winnings/losses _________ 
  
   
 
43 
 
Set 2 Script 
You have each received a clue sheet.  Do not reveal this sheet to anyone.   
You will use this clue sheet to receive a clue about what the outcome is in a particular year.  
Therefore, we will now go through some examples of how to use the clue sheet. 
Each year the experimenter will draw a bingo ball from the cage to determine if the outcome is 
x or y or z.  The experimenter will then call out a row and column.  You will use this row and 
column to determine your clue.  The other investors will use their own sheets to determine 
their clues.  
If the outcome is x then there are two possible clues:  not y and not z 
If the outcome is y then there are two possible clues:  not x and not z 
If the outcome is z then there are two possible clues:  not x and not y 
 
Everyone’s sheet is different.  Which of the two possible clues that you receive is determined 
randomly.  The clues that other investors receive are also determined randomly.  But the clues 
are distributed in such a way that exactly half of all investors receive one of the two possible 
clues and the other half receive the other possible clue.    
We will now practice with the clue sheet. 
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Clue Sheet [Each clue sheet was trader and Market Specific] 
  Clue Sheet Trader #: ________ 
       
 Columns 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 not z not x not y not z not y not x 
2 not z not x not x not y not z not y 
3 not x not y not x not z not y not z 
4 not z not y not y not x not z not x 
5 not z not x not z not y not y not x 
6 not x not x not y not y not z not z 
7 not x not x not y not z not z not y 
8 not y not z not y not x not x not z 
9 not y not z not x not x not z not y 
10 not z not y not z not y not x not x 
11 not x not z not z not y not x not y 
12 not z not z not y not y not x not x 
13 not y not x not x not z not y not z 
14 not z not z not x not y not y not x 
15 not x not y not y not z not z not x 
16 not y not x not x not z not z not y 
17 not z not z not y not y not x not x 
18 not x not y not z not x not z not y 
19 not y not z not z not x not y not x 
20 not y not y not z not z not x not x 
21 not z not y not x not z not y not x 
22 not x not z not y not z not x not y 
23 not x not x not z not y not y not z 
24 not x not x not y not z not y not z 
25 not z not y not x not z not x not y 
26 not z not y not x not z not y not x 
27 not x not x not y not z not y not z 
28 not y not x not x not z not z not y 
29 not x not y not z not z not x not y 
30 not y not y not x not z not z not x 
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Set 3 Script 
Instructions Set 3 Script  [Single Asset; State Probabilities for Markets 9 and 13] 
General. − This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research 
foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money 
which will be paid to you in cash.  
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates 
in a sequence of market years. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled 
information and record sheet, which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you 
might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private 
information.  
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
francs. Each franc is worth ____ to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of the 
experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. 
Notice that the more francs you earn the more dollars you earn.  
 
Specific Instructions  
Your profits come from two sources-from collecting certificate earnings on all certificates you 
hold at the end of the year and from buying and selling certificates. During each market year 
you are free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you wish, provided you follow the rules 
below. For each certificate you hold at the end of the year you will be given one of the three 
numbers of francs listed on row 19 of your information and record sheet. Note that earnings 
may be different for different investors. The method by which one of the three numbers is 
selected each year is explained later in these instructions. Compute your total certificate 
earnings for a period by multiplying the earnings per certificate by the number of certificates 
held. That is, (number of certificates held) x (earnings per certificate) = total certificate 
earnings. Suppose, for example, that you hold five certificates at the end of year 1. If for that 
period your earnings are _____ francs per certificate (i.e., the number selected from row 19 is 
____) then your total certificate earnings in the year would be 5 x ____ = ____ francs. This 
number should be recorded on row 19 at the end of the year.  
Sales from your certificate holdings increase your francs on hand by the amount of the sale 
price. Similarly, purchases reduce your francs on hand by the amount of the purchase price. 
Thus you can gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of certificates. At the end of each 
year all your holdings are automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0. At the 
beginning of each year you are provided with an initial holding of certificates. This is recorded 
on row 0 of the year's information and record sheet. You may sell these if you wish or you may 
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hold them. If you hold a certificate, then you receive "earnings per certificate" at the end of the 
year.  
 In addition, at the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial amount of francs on 
hand. This is also recorded on row 0 of each year's information and record sheet. You may keep 
this if you wish or you may use it to purchase certificates.  
Thus at the beginning of each year you are endowed with holdings of certificates and francs on 
hand. You are free to buy and sell certificates as you wish according to the rules below. Your 
francs on hand at the end of a year are determined by your initial amount of francs on hand, 
earnings on certificate holdings at the end of the year, and by gains and losses from purchases 
and sales of certificates. All francs on hand at the end of a year in excess of _____ francs are 
yours to keep. These are your profits for the year. 
 
Information about Dividends  
Whether the dividend you receive from the certificates you hold is the x-dividend shown on 
row 19 or the y-dividend on row 19 or the z-dividend on row 19 depends on the draw of an 
outcome from a bingo cage.  If the outcome is x the dividend is the x-dividend. If the outcome is 
y the dividend is the y-dividend.  If the outcome is z the dividend is the z-dividend.  The 
outcomes were determined before the experiment began by drawing a ball from a bingo cage 
in a manner similar to what was described earlier.   
As a reminder, each year there is a _35_% chance that the outcome is x; a _45_% chance that 
the outcome is y; and a _20_% chance that the outcome is z.    
At the beginning of each year, before trading starts, each investor will receive a clue using the 
clue sheets you have already received.   
 
Trading and Recording Rules  
(1) All transactions are for one certificate at a time. After each of your sales or purchases 
you must record the TRANSACTION PRICE in the appropriate column depending on the 
nature of the transaction. The first transaction is recorded on row (1), and succeeding 
transactions are recorded on subsequent rows. 
(2) After each transaction you must calculate and record your new holdings of certificates 
and your new francs on hand. Your holdings of certificates may go below zero. Your 
francs on hand may never go below zero.  
(3) At the end of the year record your total certificate earnings in the last column of row 19. 
If you have negative certificate holdings, you receive no dividends, and you must pay a 
penalty of 300 francs plus the highest transaction price during the period, for each 
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certificate you are short. Compute your end of period totals on row 20 by listing 
certificate holdings and adding total certificate earnings to your francs on hand. 
(4) At the end of the year, subtract from your francs on hand the amount listed in row 21 
and enter this new amount on row 22. This is your profit for the market year and is 
yours to keep. At the end of each market year, record this number on your profit sheet. 
(5) At the end of the experiment add up your total profit on your profit sheet and enter this 
sum on row 22 of your profit sheet. To convert this number into dollars, multiply by the 
number on row 23 and record the product on row 24. The experimenter will pay you 
this amount of money. 
 
Market organization. − The market for these certificates is organized as follows. The market will 
be conducted in a series of years. Each period lasts for seven minutes. Anyone wishing to 
purchase a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to buy one 
certificate at a specified price, and anyone with certificates to sell is free to accept or not accept 
the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a certificate is free to raise his or her hand and make a 
verbal offer to sell one certificate at a specified price. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding 
contract has been closed for a single certificate, and the contracting parties will record the 
transaction on their information and record sheets. Any ties in bids or acceptance will be 
resolved by random choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance, you are not to speak to 
any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to 
keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can. 
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Instructions Set 3 Script  [Contingent Claims; State Probabilities for Markets 9 and 13] 
General. − This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research 
foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow 
them carefully and make good decisions, you might earn a considerable amount of money 
which will be paid to you in cash.  
In this experiment we are going to simulate a market in which you will buy and sell certificates 
in a sequence of market years. Attached to the instructions you will find a sheet, labeled 
information and record sheet, which helps determine the value to you of any decisions you 
might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private 
information.  
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of 
francs. Each franc is worth ____ to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of the 
experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. 
Notice that the more francs you earn the more dollars you earn.  
 
Specific Instructions  
Your profits come from two sources-from collecting certificate earnings on all certificates you 
hold at the end of the year and from buying and selling certificates. During each market year 
you are free to purchase or sell as many certificates as you wish, provided you follow the rules 
below. There are three types of certificate: x-certificate, y-certificate, and z-certificate.  For 
each certificate of a given type that you hold at the end of the year you will be given either the 
number of francs listed on row 19 of your information and record sheet for that certificate type 
or 0. Note that earnings may be different for different investors. The method by which one of 
the two numbers for each certificate type is selected each year is explained later in these 
instructions. Compute your total certificate earnings for a period by multiplying the earnings 
per certificate of a given type by the number of certificates of that type held and then summing 
these three amounts. That is, (number of x-certificates held) x (earnings per x-certificate) + 
(number of y-certificates held) x (earnings per y-certificate) + (number of z-certificates held) x 
(earnings per z-certificate) = total certificate earnings. Suppose, for example, that you hold five 
x-certificates at the end of year 1. If for that period your earnings are _____ francs per x-
certificate (i.e., the number for x-certificates from row 19 is ____) then your total x-certificate 
earnings in the year would be 5 x ____ = ____ francs. Suppose you hold 4 y-certificates and 3 z-
certificates at the end of year 1. If for that period your earnings are 0 francs per certificate for y-
certificates and z-certificates then your total y-certificate earnings in the year would be 4 x 0 = 0 
francs and your total z-certificate earnings in the year would be 3 x 0 = 0 francs.  Your total 
certificate earnings would be ___ + 0 + 0 = ___ francs.  This number should be recorded on row 
19 at the end of the year.  
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Sales from your certificate holdings increase your francs on hand by the amount of the sale 
price. Similarly, purchases reduce your francs on hand by the amount of the purchase price. 
Thus you can gain or lose money on the purchase and resale of certificates. At the end of each 
year all your holdings are automatically sold to the experimenter at a price of 0. At the 
beginning of each year you are provided with an initial holding of certificates. This is recorded 
on row 0 of the year's information and record sheet. You may sell these if you wish or you may 
hold them. If you hold a certificate, then you receive "earnings per certificate" at the end of the 
year. 
 In addition, at the beginning of each year you are provided with an initial amount of francs on 
hand. This is also recorded on row 0 of each year's information and record sheet. You may keep 
this if you wish or you may use it to purchase certificates.  
Thus at the beginning of each year you are endowed with holdings of certificates and francs on 
hand. You are free to buy and sell certificates as you wish according to the rules below. Your 
francs on hand at the end of a year are determined by your initial amount of francs on hand, 
earnings on certificate holdings at the end of the year, and by gains and losses from purchases 
and sales of certificates. All francs on hand at the end of a year in excess of _____ francs are 
yours to keep. These are your profits for the year. 
 
Information about Dividends  
Whether the dividend you receive from the certificates of a given type you hold is the amount 
shown on row 19 or 0 depends on the draw of an outcome from a bingo cage.  If the outcome is 
x then x-certificates receive the x-dividend shown on row 19 while y-certificates and z-
certificates each earn 0.    If the outcome is y then y-certificates receive the y-dividend shown 
on row 19 while x-certificates and z-certificates each earn 0.  If the outcome is z then z-
certificates receive the z-dividend shown on row 19 while x-certificates and y-certificates each 
earn 0. The outcomes were determined before the experiment began by drawing a ball from a 
bingo cage in a manner similar to what was described earlier.   
As a reminder, each year there is a _35_% chance that the outcome is x; a 45_% chance that the 
outcome is y; and a _20_% chance that the outcome is z.    
At the beginning of each year, before trading starts, each investor will receive a clue using the 
clue sheets you have already received.   
 
Trading and Recording Rules  
(6) All transactions are for one certificate of a given type at a time. After each of your sales 
or purchases you must record the TRANSACTION PRICE in the appropriate column 
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depending on the nature of the transaction. The first transaction is recorded on row (1), 
and succeeding transactions are recorded on subsequent rows. 
(7) After each transaction you must calculate and record your new holdings of certificates 
and your new francs on hand. Your holdings of certificates of any type may go below 
zero. Your francs on hand may never go below zero.  
(8) At the end of the year record your total certificate earnings in the last column of row 19. 
If you have negative certificate holdings of a type, you receive no dividends for that 
type, and you must pay a penalty of 300 francs plus the highest transaction price for 
that type during the period, for each certificate you are short. Compute your end of 
period totals on row 20 by listing certificate holdings and adding total certificate 
earnings to your francs on hand. 
(9) At the end of the year, subtract from your francs on hand the amount listed in row 21 
and enter this new amount on row 22. This is your profit for the market year and is 
yours to keep. At the end of each market year, record this number on your profit sheet. 
(10) At the end of the experiment add up your total profit on your profit sheet and enter this 
sum on row 22 of your profit sheet. To convert this number into dollars, multiply by the 
number on row 23 and record the product on row 24. The experimenter will pay you 
this amount of money. 
 
Market organization. − The market for these certificates is organized as follows. The market will 
be conducted in a series of years. Each period lasts for seven minutes. Anyone wishing to 
purchase a certificate of a given type is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal bid to 
buy one certificate of a given type at a specified price, and anyone with certificates of the given 
type to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a certificate 
of a given type is free to raise his or her hand and make a verbal offer to sell one certificate of a 
given type at a specified price. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed 
for a single certificate, and the contracting parties will record the transaction on their 
information and record sheets. Any ties in bids or acceptance will be resolved by random 
choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance, you are not to speak to any other subject. 
There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying. You are 
free to make as much profit as you can. 
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Name __________________________________ 
 
PROFIT SHEET 
Row Market Year Profit 
1 1  
2 2  
3 3  
4 4  
5 5  
6 6  
7 7  
8 8  
9 9  
10 10  
11 11  
12 12  
13 13  
14 14  
15 15  
16 16  
17 17  
18 18  
19 19  
20 20  
21   
22 Total profit (in francs)  
23 Dollars per franc 0.00324 
24 Total dollars profit  
 
24 This exchange rate varies across markets. 
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Trader No. ____ 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET [Single Asset] 
YEAR _______ 
 Transaction 
Number 
Transaction Price 
Sale      Purchase 
Certificates  
on Hand 
Francs  
on Hand 
Beginning of the 
Year Holdings 0 
///////////////////// 
/////////////////////   
 1     
 2     
 3     
 4     
 5     
 6     
 7     
 8     
 9     
 10     
 11     
 12     
 13     
 14     
 15     
 16     
 17     
 18     
x-Dividend _____ 
y-Dividend _____ 
z-Dividend _____ 
19 
Total Certificate Earnings 
Dividend Rate 
on Hand at the End of the Year 
 
 
20 Total Francs on Hand at the End of the Year 
 
 
21 Less:  Fixed Costs  
 
22 End of Year Net Profit  
Transfer this amount 
    to your Profit Sheet 
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Trader No. ____ 
INFORMATION AND RECORD SHEET [Contingent Claims] 
YEAR ________ 
 Transaction 
Number 
Transaction Price 
Sale      Purchase 
Certificates  
on Hand 
x   y   z 
Francs  
on Hand 
Beginning of the 
Year Holdings 0 ///////////////////// /////////////////////     
 1       
 2       
 3       
 4       
 5       
 6       
 7       
 8       
 9       
 10       
 11       
 12       
 13       
 14       
 15       
 16       
 17       
 18       
x-Dividend _____ 
  
y-Dividend _____ 
 
z-Dividend _____ 
19 
    Total Certificate Earnings 
    Dividend Rate 
    on Hand at the End of the Year 
 
 
20     Total Francs on Hand at the     End of the Year  
 
21     Less:  Fixed Costs  
 
22     End of Year Net Profit  
    Transfer this amount 
    to your Profit Sheet 
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Demonstration of Market [Single Asset] 
We will now go through a demonstration of how the market will work. 
The auctioneer will announce the market is open. 
Suppose that Trader 13 wants to offer to buy a certificate at a price of 25.  Trader 13 would 
raise her paddle and the auctioneer would call on her saying something like “Trader 13.”  
Trader 13 would then respond with “Bid of 25.” The auctioneer will repeat the order: “Trader 
13 Bids 25.”  This will be recorded on the board.  [The order is marked on the board.]   
Now suppose that Trader 14 wants to offer to sell a certificate at a price of 500.  Trader 14 
should raise his paddle.  When the auctioneer calls on Trader 14, Trader 14 should announce 
“Ask 500.”  The auctioneer will repeat “Trader 14 Asks 500.” This will then be recorded on the 
board. [The order is marked on the board.]   
This process will continue as long as someone wants to improve on the currently standing bid 
or ask or accept the standing bid or ask.  For example, Trader 13 may raise her paddle and after 
being called state “Bid of 100.”  The auctioneer will repeat “Trader 13 Bids 100” and this will be 
marked on the board.  [The order is marked on the board.]  Notice that you can improve upon 
your own bid or ask. 
If Trader 15 is willing to sell at 100, the current standing bid, Trader 15 can raise her paddle.  
When called upon Trader 15 will state “Accept Bid 100.” The auctioneer will repeat that “Trader 
15 Accepts Bid of 100.”  At this point Trader 13 and 15 have traded a single certificate and this 
will be reflected on the board by circling the accepted bid.  [Circle the accepted bid on the 
board and write Trader 15 on the line as the seller.]    
Trader 13 will record on her Information and Record sheet that she purchased a certificate by 
writing the price in the Purchase column in the row corresponding to Transaction 1.   She will 
then update her Certificates on Hand and Francs on Hand.  Similarly, Trader 15 will record on 
her Information and Record sheet that she sold a certificate by writing the price in the Sale 
column in the row corresponding to Transaction 1.   She will then update her Certificates on 
Hand and Francs on Hand.  
A line will be drawn across the market record on the board indicating that all of the previous 
bids and asks are no longer available. The auctioneer will then invite new bids or asks. 
Trader 13 may state an Ask of 600. 
Trader 14 may state an Ask of 542. 
Trader 16 may state a Bid of 33. 
Trader 17 may state a Bid of 35. 
Trader 16 may state a bid of 40. 
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Trader 17 may state a Bid of 60. 
Trader 14 may state an Ask 500. 
Trader 15 may Accept the Bid of 60.  
At this point, the bid of 60 is circled and Traders 17 would record the price of 60 under 
Purchase in the row for Transaction 1.  Trader 17 would then update his Certificates on Hand 
and Francs on Hand. Notice that for Trader 15 this would be her second transaction, so she 
would record the Sale price on the row for Transaction 2 and then update the remainder of the 
row. 
A line will be drawn across the market record on the board indicating that all of the previous 
bids and asks are no longer available and the auctioneer will again invite new bids or asks.  This 
process continues until 7 minutes have passed at which point no more bids, asks, or acceptance 
can be made.  
Suppose there are no more transactions involving Trader 15 in the market year.  If the state is Y, 
given the fictitious values in this example, Trader 15 would complete their Information and 
Record Sheet as follows: 
Total Certificate Earnings in Row 19 would be: 8 * 100 = 800 
Total Francs on Hand in Row 20 would be: 20,160 
End of Year Net Profit in Row 22 would be:  800 + 20,160 – 20,000 = 960. 
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Demonstration of Market [Contingent Claims] 
We will now go through a demonstration of how the market will work. 
The auctioneer will announce the market is open. 
Suppose that Trader 13 wants to offer to buy an X certificate at a price of 25.  Trader 13 would 
raise her paddle and the auctioneer would call on her saying something like “Trader 13.”  
Trader 13 would then respond with “Bid on X of 25.” The auctioneer will repeat the order: 
“Trader 13 Bid on X of 25.”  This will be recorded on the board.  [The order is marked on the 
board.]   
Now suppose that Trader 14 wants to offer to sell an X certificate at a price of 500.  Trader 14 
should raise his paddle.  When the auctioneer calls on Trader 14, Trader 14 should announce 
“Ask for X of 500.”  The auctioneer will repeat “Trader 14 Ask for X of 500.” This will then be 
recorded on the board. [The order is marked on the board.]   
This process will continue as long as someone wants to improve on the currently standing bid 
or ask or accept the standing bid or ask.  For example, Trader 13 may raise her paddle and after 
being called state “Bid on X of 100.”  The auctioneer will repeat “Trader 13 Bid on X of 100” and 
this will be marked on the board.  [The order is marked on the board.]  Notice that you can 
improve upon your own bid or ask. 
If Trader 15 is willing to sell X at 100, the current standing bid, Trader 15 can raise her paddle.  
When called upon Trader 15 will state “Accept Bid on X of 100.” The auctioneer will repeat that 
“Trader 15 Accepts Bid on X of 100.”  At this point Trader 13 and 15 have traded a single X 
certificate and this will be reflected on the board by circling the accepted bid.  [Circle the 
accepted bid on the board and write Trader 15 on the line as the seller.]    
Trader 13 will record on her Information and Record sheet that she purchased an X certificate 
by writing the price in the Purchase column in the row corresponding to Transaction 1.   She will 
then update her Certificates on Hand and Francs on Hand.  Similarly, Trader 15 will record on 
her Information and Record sheet that she sold an X certificate by writing the price in the Sale 
column in the row corresponding to Transaction 1.   She will then update her Certificates on 
Hand and Francs on Hand.  
A line will be drawn across the X market record on the board indicating that all of the previous 
bids and asks for X certificates are no longer available. The auctioneer will then invite new bids 
or asks. 
Trader 13 may state an Ask for X of 600. 
Trader 14 may state an Ask for Y of 542. 
Trader 17 may state a Bid on Y of 35 
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Trader 16 may state a Bid on X of 33. 
Trader 16 may state a bid on X of 40. 
Trader 17 may state a Bid on Y of 60. 
Trader 14 may state an Ask on X for 500. 
Trader 15 may Accept the Bid on Y of 60.  
At this point, the bid of 60 for Y is circled and Trader 17 would record the price of 60 under 
Purchase in the row for Transaction 1.  Trader 17 would then update all of his Certificates on 
Hand and Francs on Hand. Notice that for Trader 15 this would be her second transaction, so 
she would record the Sale price on the row for Transaction 2 and then update the remainder of 
the row. 
A line will be drawn across the market record for Y on the board indicating that all of the 
previous bids and asks for Y are no longer available and the auctioneer will again invite new 
bids or asks.  Notice that the bids and asks for X are still available.  This process continues until 
7 minutes have passed at which point no more bids, asks, or acceptance can be made.   
Suppose there are no more transactions involving Trader 15 in the market year.  If the state is Y, 
given the fictitious values in this example, Trader 15 would complete their Information and 
Record Sheet as follows: 
Total Certificate Earnings in Row 19 would be: 9 * 0 + 9 * 100 + 10 * 0 = 900 
Total Francs on Hand in Row 20 would be: 20,160 
End of Year Net Profit in Row 22 would be:  900 + 20,160 – 20,000 = 1,060. 
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Appendix C.  
Additional Evidence on Series B and C and Graphs of Transaction Prices by Sessions for 
Markets 4, 5, 7, and 8 
 
Allocations 
As in P&S, we proceed by assessing whether the allocation of shares at the end of each period 
(corresponding to the last occurrence of each state of nature) is consistent with the allocation 
predicted by each model (see Appendix A or P&S), and we compare the fit across models. The 
allocation statistic is determined via the formula: 
𝑀𝑀 = ���𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 −
𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐� ���𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚) − 𝑛𝑛�𝑐𝑐
𝑖𝑖∈𝐼𝐼𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐∈𝐶𝐶
�� 𝑥𝑥100 
where 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐 represents the number of shares of certificates c held by investor 𝑖𝑖 at the end of the 
market, Ic denotes the set of traders predicted to hold the asset, C denotes the set of certificates 
in the market, 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖,𝑐𝑐(𝑚𝑚) corresponds to the number of shares predicted to be held by investor 𝑖𝑖 
according to model m, and 𝑛𝑛� is set to the average number of shares initially held by all investors 
in Ic. This ratio is then averaged over the three periods in which each state was realized for the 
last time.  The values for each replicate of each session are shown in Table C1 and can be 
compared to Table IV in P&S. The RE model provides no prediction for Series C because all traders 
end up learning the true asset value and thus are only willing to trade at this exact value.  The 
MM model provides no allocation predictions in Series B because all traders value the asset at 0. 
 
In line with our previous findings on price predictions, the RE model does not outperform either 
PI or MM. These findings contradict Conclusion 3 in P&S (p. 1106) according to which “In all 
series, allocations aggregated over the final occurrence of each state are more accurately 
predicted by the RE model than either the PI or MM.” However, when looking at Series B only we 
do find that the RE model outperforms PI which is the only alternative model for which we have a 
prediction. This supports Finding 2 in the main text. 
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Table C1.  Comparison of Actual Allocations with the Allocations Predicted by Three Models 
Criterion: Percent of Predicted Flow of Securities that Actually Occurred at the End of Each 
Market 
Market Experiments Models 
Series Market Replicate PI RE MM 
B 
4 
1 4.44 12.50 No Prediction 
2 3.89 12.50 No Prediction 
3 3.89 22.92 No Prediction 
4 9.45 12.50 No Prediction 
5 
1 14.88 45.83 No Prediction 
2 16.67 50.00 No Prediction 
3 20.83 70.83 No Prediction 
4 14.83 52.08 No Prediction 
C 
7 
1 31.94 No Prediction 41.67 
2 27.78 No Prediction 25.00 
3 9.21 No Prediction 27.08 
4 38.89 No Prediction 47.92 
8 
1 5.56 No Prediction 45.84 
2 38.89 No Prediction 37.50 
3 52.78 No Prediction 29.17 
4 30.56 No Prediction 49.99 
9 
1 40.28 No Prediction 52.09 
2 26.39 No Prediction 27.09 
3 23.61 No Prediction 25.00 
4 43.06 No Prediction 60.42 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests 
 
             ↑____________↑ 
                      ↓ 
↑____________↑ 
                     ↓ 
B-series Sessions 88 
0.035(RE) Undefined 
C-series Sessions Undefined Undefined 
All Sessions 265 
0.203(RE) 
135 
0.487(MM) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, the last 
period in which the state was Y and the last period in which the state was Z, as applicable.  Each 
statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the lower portion of the table 
contains the associated test statistic and level of significance.  The model in parentheses is the one 
favored by the data based on the median.  This table is comparable to Table IV in P&S.  However, P&S 
report that a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test is used, but that test is not defined for any comparison 
between RE and another model except for a test between PI and RE in Series-B Markets.  The test 
statistic for such a test would be 0 based on our data with a p-value of 0.012 with the data favoring 
RE.       
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Profits 
 
Finally, we compare the models’ predictions on the distribution of profits. In Table C2 
(comparable to Table V in P&S), we display the weighted sum of the squared deviation between 
the average earnings of a trader of a given type and information and the average predicted 
earnings, given the trader’s type and information, averaged over the three periods 
corresponding to the last occurrence of each state of nature.25 In line with our previous findings 
on price and allocation predictions, we do not find that the RE model outperforms both 
alternatives; although, it significantly outperforms PI. These findings lead us to reject 
Conclusion 4 in P&S (p. 1108) according to which “In all series the RE model is a significantly 
better predictor of the distribution of profits than either the PI model or the MM model.” On a 
positive note, when studied separately RE is shown to outperform the other two models in 
Series C markets.  However, the profit prediction of the RE model for Series C markets is for 
every trader in the market to receive the same profit.  Hence the RE model predicts that each 
person receives the average profit, which may drive some of the apparent success.  A model 
that predicted no one ever placed a bid or ask in the market would have done equally well on 
this criterion for Series C. This evidence supports Finding 3 in the main text. 
  
 
25 Each model is silent with regards to which specific traders of a given type with a given piece of information 
should hold the assets. That is, if two traders of the same type, possessing the same private information, are 
predicted to purchase two assets being offered for sale, the models are silent as to whether one trader will buy 
both or each will buy one.  Our approach thus removes profit deviations that are due to the allocation of assets 
within a given class of trader.     
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Table C2.  Comparison of Actual Distribution of Profits to Distribution Predicted by Three 
Models 
Criterion: Squared Sum of Deviations from the Mean Across Investors at the End of Each Market 
Market Experiments Models 
Series Market Replicate PI RE MM 
B 
4 
1 8644.73 638.31 245.51 
2 8782.26 684.59 262.73 
3 8932.91 686.13 283.23 
4 8302.06 604.81 245.21 
5 
1 24266.25 2721.85 1949.32 
2 25360.95 2474.61 2182.88 
3 24838.72 1912.72 1989.12 
4 25273.38 2858.71 2068.18 
C 
7 
1 4281.22 49.62 3422.95 
2 4752.76 7.30 3787.30 
3 5473.51 36.55 4783.22 
4 3408.69 201.63 2894.96 
8 
1 819.42 51.95 145.95 
2 729.95 3.95 42.61 
3 272.03 1220.29 1578.69 
4 952.74 13.57 401.57 
9 
1 1489.34 1197.76 951.10 
2 2969.62 95.46 3762.12 
3 2224.53 256.19 2989.52 
4 2133.63 361.39 1971.72 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Sum Tests 
 
        ↑_________↑ 
                ↓ 
↑_________↑ 
                ↓ 
B-series Sessions 36 
0.012(RE) 
35 
0.017(MM) 
C-series Sessions 73 
0.008(RE) 
75 
0.005(RE) 
All Sessions 205 
<0.001(RE) 
139 
0.204(RE) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, 
the last period in which the state was Y and the last period in which the state was Z, as 
applicable.  Each statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the 
lower portion of the table contains the associated test statistic and level of significance 
as well.  The model in parentheses is the one favored by the data based on the median.  
This table is comparable to Table V in P&S.   
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Figure C1a.  Prices in Market 4 Sessions – Asset X 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9          
State Z Z Z X X Y X Y Z          
Average Prices                 
P&S 97 10 20 170 215 80 215 - -          
Rep 84 52 57 88 107 73 98 69 78          
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Figure C1b.  Prices in Market 4 Sessions – Asset Y 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
State Z Z Z X X Y X Y Z         
Average Prices                
P&S 58 57 - 2 - 154 1 158 -         
Rep 97 64 72 53 58 89 67 107 64         
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Figure C1c.  Prices in Market 4 Sessions – Asset Z 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
State Z Z Z X X Y X Y Z         
Average Prices                
P&S 181 223 268 - - - - 175 286         
Rep 104 86 83 77 68 67 52 77 108         
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Figure C2a.  Prices in Market 5 Sessions - Asset X 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
State X Z Y Y X X Y X Z         
Average Prices                
P&S 181 100 46 4 250 385 - 414 -         
Rep 175 83 86 79 210 252 98 229 35         
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Figure C2b.  Prices in Market 5 Sessions - Asset Y 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
State X Z Y Y X X Y X Z         
Average Prices                
P&S 156 109 299 296 1 31 306 - -         
Rep 95 71 245 253 83 108 256 150 90         
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Figure C2c.  Prices in Market 5 Sessions - Asset Z 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9         
State X Z Y Y X X Y X Z         
Average Prices                
P&S 193 315 1 67 1 32 - 1 449         
Rep 70 255 130 104 100 95 87 81 362         
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Figure C3.  Prices in Market 7 Sessions 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  11 12 13 14    
State Z X X X X Y Y X Z Y  Z Z Y X    
 Average Prices    
P&S 291 222 197 228 170 235 241 148 256 246  348 449 240 84    
Rep 239 304 223 229 233 231 238 196 271 248  279 311 249 121    
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Figure C4.  Prices in Market 8 Sessions 
 
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7           
State Z X Z Y Y Y X           
Average Prices                
P&S 512 140 517 376 366 369 126           
Rep 438 214 454 370 376 384 265           
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Appendix D. Additional Findings for Experienced Traders in Series B and C Markets 
Tables D1, D2 and D3 compare RE with PI and MM using only data from experienced traders (Markets 5 and 8) for each of the 
criterion used in P&S. 
 
Table D1.  Comparison of Actual Prices to Prices Predicted by Three Models at the End of Each Market for Sessions with Experienced 
Traders (Markets 5 and 8) 
 MAD Log Odds Under Normality Percentage of Convergent Price Changes 
    PI   RE MM PI   RE MM PI     RE MM 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Sum 
Tests 
   ↑_____↑ 
   ↓ 
↑______↑ 
        ↓ 
  ↑______↑ 
↓ 
↑______↑ 
↓ 
           ↑_______↑ 
         ↓ 
↑________↑ 
             ↓ 
All Sessions 29 
0.124(PI) 
25 
0.327(RE) 
23 
0.484(PI) 
30 
0.093(RE) 
30 
0.079(RE) 
26 
0.262(RE) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, the last period in which the state was Y and the last period in 
which the state was Z.  Each statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the lower portion of the table contains the associated test 
statistic and level of significance as well.  The model in parentheses is the one favored by the data based on the median.  This table is comparable to Table 
III in P&S.   
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Table D2.  Comparison of Actual Allocations with the Allocations Predicted by Three Models 
Criterion: Percent of Predicted Flow of Securities that Actually Occurred at the End of Each 
Market for Sessions with Experienced Traders (Markets 5 and 8) 
 Models 
            PI            RE MM 
Wilcoxon Rank Sum Tests             ↑___________↑ 
                    ↓ 
↑___________↑ 
                    ↓ 
All Sessions 39 
0.027(RE) 
24 
0.083(MM) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, the last 
period in which the state was Y and the last period in which the state was Z, as applicable.  Each 
statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the lower portion of the table 
contains the associated test statistic and level of significance as well.  The model in parentheses is the 
one favored by the data based on the median.  This table is comparable to Table IV in P&S.  However, 
P&S report that a Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test is used, but that test is not defined for any 
comparison between RE and another model except for a test between PI and RE in Series-B Markets.  
The test statistic for such a test would be 0 based on our data with a p-value of 0.012 with the data 
favoring RE.       
 
Table D3.  Comparison of Actual Distribution of Profits to Distribution Predicted by Three 
Models 
Criterion: Squared Sum of Deviations from the Mean Across Investors at the End of Each Market 
for Sessions with Experienced Traders (Markets 5 and 8) 
 Models 
        PI RE  MM 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Sum 
Tests 
      ↑_________↑ 
              ↓ 
↑_________↑ 
              ↓ 
All Sessions 32 
0.050(RE) 
19 
0.889(RE) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, 
the last period in which the state was Y and the last period in which the state was Z, as 
applicable.  Each statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the 
lower portion of the table contains the associated test statistic and level of significance 
as well.  The model in parentheses is the one favored by the data based on the median.  
This table is comparable to Table V in P&S.   
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Appendix E:  Additional Evidence on Series D for Markets 12 and 13 
 
This appendix compares RE to PI and MM on the basis of profit, as was done in Table C2 for 
Series B and C markets.  The analysis is presented in Table E1.  For Series D, neither RE nor MM 
make a prediction regarding who should hold the assets and thus, no analysis analogous to that 
reported in Table C1 is possible.   
 
Table E1.  Comparison of Actual Distribution of Profits to Distribution Predicted by Three Models 
Criterion: Squared Sum of Deviations from the Mean Across Investors at the End of Each Market 
Market Experiments Models 
Series Market Replicate PI RE MM 
D 
12 
1 632.54 45.88 45.88 
2 980.33 0.00 0.00 
3 1205.90 70.84 70.84 
4 846.41 13.81 13.81 
13 
1 2801.49 16.40 16.40 
2 3265.36 1.41 1.41 
3 3213.30 0.57 0.57 
4 3242.76 0.00 0.00 
Wilcoxon Signed Ranked Sum Tests 
 
        ↑_________↑ 
                 ↓ 
↑_________↑ 
              ↓ 
D-series Sessions 36 
0.012(RE) 
 
B&D Sessions 136 
<0.001(RE) 
 
C&D Sessions 183 
<0.001(RE) 
152 
0.003(RE) 
All Sessions 399 
<0.001(RE) 
235 
0.248(RE) 
Reported metrics for each session are based on the last period in which the state was X, 
the last period in which the state was Y and the last period in which the state was Z, as 
applicable.  Each statistical test compares RE to an alternative model.  Each cell in the 
lower portion of the table contains the associated test statistic and level of significance 
as well.  The model in parentheses is the one favored by the data based on the median.  
This table is comparable to Table V in P&S.   
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Appendix F: Alternative Estimates of PSP 
 
Since effect sizes may be overestimates in small-sample studies, we repeat the analysis 
reported in Tables 4 and 8 assuming that the actual effect size is two thirds of the implied effect 
size given the p-values reported in P&S. Under this assumption, the power attained by P&S to 
detect such an effect size in Series B and C between RE and PI was 0.71 and between RE and 
MM was 0.6263. The implied power of our replication under this assumption is 0.99983 and 
0.9987, respectively. As seen in Table F1, the implications are qualitatively unchanged. In light 
of the additional evidence provided by our replication, the PSP that RE outperforms the other 
models in Series B and C markets is quite low, unless one had an extremely strong prior. 
Table F1.  Post Study Probability that MAD Lower Under RE than PI or MM in Series B and C  
Probability RE outperforms PI  Probability RE outperforms MM 
Prior 
PSP after 
P&S 
PSP after 
Replication  Prior 
PSP after 
P&S 
PSP after 
Replication 
0.99 0.9993 0.2056  0.99 0.9992 0.6371 
0.95 0.9963 0.0437  0.95 0.9958 0.2520 
0.9 0.9923 0.0230  0.9 0.9912 0.1376 
0.75 0.9771 0.0078  0.75 0.9741 0.0505 
0.5 0.9343 0.0026  0.5 0.9261 0.0174 
0.25 0.8259 0.0009  0.25 0.8068 0.0059 
0.1 0.6126 0.0003  0.1 0.5819 0.0020 
0.05 0.4282 0.0001  0.05 0.3973 0.0009 
0.01 0.1257 <0.0001  0.01 0.1123 0.0002 
Under the same assumption, our power to detect two thirds of the reported effect size 
underlying Table 8 (i.e. an effect of z = 1.75) is 0.9791. Table F2 shows that under these 
assumptions the results in Table 8 are also robust. 
Table F2.  Post Study Probability that MAD Lower Under RE than PI or MM for Series D 
Probability RE outperforms PI  Probability RE outperforms MM 
Prior  PSP   Prior  PSP  
0.99   0.9995   0.99   0.9995  
0.95   0.9973   0.95   0.9973  
0.9   0.9944   0.9   0.9944  
0.75   0.9833   0.75   0.9833  
0.5   0.9514   0.5   0.9514  
0.25   0.8672   0.25   0.8672  
0.1   0.6851   0.1   0.6851  
0.05   0.5076   0.05   0.5076  
0.01   0.1651   0.01   0.1651  
 
